Introduction
It is now three full decades since China"s post-Mao political elite set out to reshape the economy of the nation. Throughout this period, each new urban policy the leaders promoted-whether changes to the responsibilities and powers of the enterprises and their associated "units";
allowing for free-market pricing; legitimating the private sector; sponsoring housing ownership; opening up stock markets; creating insurance for health care and upgrading and expanding education; encouraging competition in and modernization of transportation and communications; and the development of an urban real estate regime, plus all the technologies that have arisen in the wake of these steps--has been presented to the populace as a "reform."
Perhaps it is time to take stock of the literal denotation of the concept. According to one dictionary, 1 to reform is to "make changes for improvement in order to remove abuse and injustice; to bring, lead or force to abandon a wrong or evil course of life or conduct and adopt a right one." This definition suggests not just betterment, but also a directedness toward the future, an amelioration of the past. What has been was incorrect and what is to be is rectification. In short, reform is movement toward the "modern." And indeed, the thrust of urban reform has been along precisely this route for perhaps some eighty percent-plus of the urban populace. They, the majority, the ones who get all the press, stand in the forefront; they are the vanguard of modernity, the beneficiaries of all the reforms, as we will see. Their steps are upward, onward.
But marketization, which has also entailed enterprises being urged to push for profit, with the less well-endowed firms shunted into bankruptcy, their former workers abandoned to unemployment, and the privatization of benefits that had once been state-funded and guaranteed--meant that for the others, those who lost their jobs and with them their welfare and wherewithal, if not their homes and their health--the years since this set of alterations began to unfurl (especially over those years in the second half of the so-termed "reform period") have seen not forward motion but time warp, and their steps are downward, a descent. Again, to delineate the label I use, "time warp" specifies "a hypothetical discontinuity or distortion occurring in the flow of time that would move events from one time period to another or suspend the passage of time."
Alternatively, the notion conveys a circumstance in which something has "not changed even though everyone or everything else has; an imaginary situation in which the past or future becomes the present." 2 For these losers, in many (if not all) ways the positive impacts of the reforms have passed them by. For them, materially life appears to have returned to the pre-1978 times of old, to the days when all ownership was public (or so-called "collective") and poverty was pervasive and unexceptional, thus pretty much normalized. Today, by contrast, it is they alone who experience impoverishment in the midst of commonplace complacence, and who therefore depart from the mode. Moreover, whereas before their circumstances were firmly undergirded by state guarantees, they live now in destitution with no real security, and with the status loss that has come alongside the banality of comfort for their under construction in the metropolises, a structure in which the victors are visible, the defeated, however, mostly out of sight. Besides, one could argue, that very invisibility is a prominent component of the model of modernity both envisioned and fashioned by the Party elite. In the paper that follows I set out this trope of the "market,"one simplified through positing two modal, contrasting modes of procurement and consumption in relation to new possibilities in the search for comfort created-or, alternatively, necessitated--by social reforms--either for luxury, pleasure and extravagance, on one side, yet only for bare sustenance, on the other.
In the course of this recital I refer to the chief economic-cum-social reforms that fashioned these alternatives. My goal is to expose the divergent range of experiences, behaviors and impacts that these sofamous economic reforms unfolding since 1978 in China"s municipalities have manufactured for different sets of folk.
After briefly offering some numbers that can describe the respective situations of opposing social elements associated with the social reforms of the past 30 years, I touch on these topics associated:
buying to eat, housing disparities, stances toward clothing and other commodities of common usage, dissimilarities in styles of life (as in recreation and culture), the acquisition and the nature of education and health care that the two social sectors, respectively, can command today;
and their dissimilar modes of communications and travel. I also take a look at the quite unlike effects of the reform-era birth of stock markets and real estate markets, and of recent rises in prices-all a function of marketization--upon separate segments of society. In conclusion, I make the case that even a quick glimpse of these parallel but mirror-image postures toward what could be called "marketing" or "shopping," and the conflicting scenarios in which such action takes place help to uncover the split urban society that is accompanying the urban reforms much more richly than the oft-publicized naked numbers on income gaps alone can do. on the other. 31 The late 1990s research of Tang Jun, a sociologist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and his group found the povertystricken surviving on wilting vegetables and scant protein in the late 1990s;
I also found even eggs to be a precious food reserved on the rare occasions it was purchased for growing children in similar homes a decade later. Among the poorest sector of the population, grain accounted for At the other end of the spectrum, the laid-off and penurious yet huddle in cramped, often one-room, run-down apartments left over from the days of the state-sponsored, industrial danwei, yet "crowded into the tiny flats" of the Maoist era that David Fraser has described as relics of the past. 41 There they subsist to this day, even as their original units have disappeared, praying that their tiny space will not soon be demolished by the ubiquitous urban developers and rezoning projects pervading more and more urban space. 42 Indeed, the shake-up in spending habits was far from universal.
Thus, while articles of wear such as name-brand shoes, sportswear and dresses had become common for middle-class children, and while parents purchased multiple sets of clothing per season for them--garments which they themselves even assisted in choosing 49 --the offspring of the new poor persisted in dressing as they had under Mao, in hand-me-downs.
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The latter, in fact, as their parents before them, never went shopping.
The impoverished, in fact, continue, as they had pre-1980, buying only books, food supplements and medicines for their young, never extras. At the same time, unemployed former workers stared hopelessly at old small-screen TV"s, and poor factory hands spent their one day off per month purchasing such simple items as cheap lipsticks, jeans and T-shirts, by way of contrast. 61 And, just as city parks served as the principal venue for amusement and pleasure for the populace as a whole in the prereform days, 62 so they continued to do so for those among the destitute who had the spirit and the energy to venture out of their homes at all.
Another differentiating factor is the use of credit in stores: while the less well-endowed and, even more so, the impoverished shoppers still trade in cash as ever they did in the now-distant past, the elite and For the poor, however, education became affordable--as it had been for all children during the time of Mao--only when subsidized by the state.
In this instance, however, not only did many impoverished families not receive the subsidies they were meant to get, but the difficulties that mandated these subsidies were severe. According to Tang Jun"s 1998-99 study in five cities, poor families" hopes for their kids are even greater than are those in ordinary households, because the success of the next generation is such families" only hope of rising out of poverty. The commercialization of education has been a heavy assault on these families.
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In the five cities where Tang become resigned to her son"s having dropped out of school: "He"s 16, after finishing junior high he has discontinued his studies and is staying at home.
There"s no money for him to go on." Another parent of a 16-year-old boy is determined to put him through higher education. "Yes, there"s no question that he"ll go on, but when I think about college I get so worried that my scalp tingles.
When the time comes if I can come up with a solution to this problem, that"ll be good..I"m considering making him study at a free teachers" college, relying on the dibao, but that little money is far, far from being enough."
And these apprehensions are not found only in families where money must be tracked down for financing higher education. One woman, the mother of 10-year-old twins who were considered a precious blessing back at the time of their birth, when people such as their parents were all employed, at this point the bemoans her fate:
Now while they"re at primary school it"s okay, don"t have to spend too much money..later if they both go on to middle school, expenditures will be too much, their father and I are very worried, can"t not let kids go to school or in the future there will be even less of a way out. And both are boys; if they were girls, and found a good marriage we could be done with it, but with boys there are more considerations. These are things we ordinarily don"t want to give too much thought to, as soon as we think about them we just worry, so we just pass our days like this and then we"ll think about it.
So even as these parents agonize over finding the cash to cultivate their children, at the same time they imagine those very same children as their saviors for their own coming years. Because of the exigencies surrounding funding education, large numbers among the recipients of the dibao--if not every one of them--appear as of this reading to be locked into an inter-generational trap whose longterm label must be "the underclass."
Health care
Marketization has also meant a considerable increase in the charges for it is blatantly obvious that those living hand-to-mouth will have to do without much of the treatment involved.
There is some health-care assistance for the poor, as in education, but the help is only minimal. As Tang Jun"s group discovered a decade ago, in general the situation was, and remains today, dire. In my translation of his words, "When a household"s economic condition is poor, its health is poor too and the risk of serious illness is also great. Once it falls into poverty, there"s a vicious cycle..small illnesses often turn into big ones with no treatment." When the indigent people he studied were questioned as to whether they could afford to see a doctor when ill, between 50 and 70 percent in the several cities replied that they could not. Thus, as before the reforms began, many families simply do not pay. But in the present era this is not because there are no costs, as before, but because there is no way for poor people to meet those that now exist.
Either they go without proper treatment, or, as Tang Jun"s group noted a decade ago, "When there was no other possibility, they went to friends and relatives to seek aid or to request a loan." she"s from the countryside and has never worked, for her medical funds she"s completely dependent on me. Before, when she wasn"t sick, she could do household chores, now she can only lie on the bed, can"t do anything. The medical fees are very high, she sometimes gets dialysis. We basically despise this illness, everyday she stays home, takes a little medicine, and in this way drags on.
Soon the wife chimes in:
The doctors in the hospital would let you stay in the hospitall for treatment, but we haven"t so much money, basically we can"t afford it. Each day I can take some medicine to control the illness, and that"s very good, I can"t hope to cure the illness, can just live a day and write it off [huo yitian, suan yitian], sometimes I think if I can only lie on the bed all day like this, unable to do anything, it"s the family"s burden, it"s not as good as dying earlier.
As she speaks, there"s a tear in her eye and the daughter quietly goes away.
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In another home, an old mother is prostrate, paralyzed on the bed, as she has been for half a year. "Now she"s very old," explains her daughter-in-law, her health situation is very poor, her pension is all used up in seeing doctors and buying medicine." Yet one more futile scenario features a wife, aged 47, again confined to her bed. She contracted a thyroid disease nine years before. "At first, it wasn"t serious and we didn"t pay much attention to it," she recounted.
"Afterward, it slowly got severe, and I took a lot of hormone-type medicine. (or close to half of the total population of the country) worked a mobile phone and 253 million were using the Web, 84 while pagers and faxes had already joined the well-to-do to each other by the 1990s. 85 Wu Yanrui points out that by the mid-1990s it was possible to find "thousands of yuan spent to buy a phone number that was said to be lucky."
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For these items, the disparities among income groups are pronounced: as of the end of the year 2006, 47 urban households of every 100 was a computer owner, on average, just eight of every 100 households was among the poorest.
For those with the greatest wealth, however, 91.4 homes were equipped with them, making computers more than 10 times as numerous among this sector of the populace as among the impoverished. Though the ratio was not as extreme in the case of mobile phones, the overall picture was similar: 153 phones per household was the average, but among the poor the average fell to 64.3, while 211 phones could be found, on average, per 100 wealthy homes. 87 Elisabeth
Croll, drawing upon a Far Eastern Economic Review survey of elite consumers, notes that 98 percent of those investigated already had a mobile phone at yearend 2002, while the next year 85 percent of them owned a computer.
88
As Elisabeth Croll has remarked, for the social elite and the middle stratum of today, media communication has become rapid, and connections with the West relatively widespread. 89 But for many among the destitute, the situation in regard to the modes of interpersonal interactions and extra-local exchanges has not changed so very much. Croll has noted that in pre-reform times, contact was "conducted largely in person"; 90 sociologist Deborah Davis characterized personal phone calls in the past as "rare" and as having to be made in public locations. 91 These descriptions make it clear that as the elite moved forward into modernity, the penniless stayed, as if stuck, in the past. percent. 114 For, as noted above, while expenditures on food ate up nearly half of the income (47 percent) of the poorest by then, such spending accounted for just around a quarter of income (27 percent) for the wealthiest 115 Thus, when food prices shot up, it was the destitute, aiming just at satisfying their most basic livelihood demands, who were hit particularly hard.
And as food prices rose, those for stocks and property values ascended in tandem, benefiting the better-off: in 2006, the rate of increase for property-type income was over 25 percent, for instance. 117 Consequently, while 47 percent of the families whose monthly income fell below 1,000 yuan told a survey researcher that they were worried about food price increases, only about a fifth of those with incomes above 5,000 yuan per month took note. Indeed, in 2007, land speculators were themselves behind the spurt in housing prices and sucked out a large profit from. 118 At the same time, the poorer, ensconced in old Maoera apartments, cared little (at the rate of just 9.5 percent) about the rise in housing prices, while nearly a quarter of rich people were concerned. 119 As two researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences phrased it, "Currency inflation robs the poor and benefits the rich." So as high-income individuals could rely on the propensity of property to maintain or increase its value to compensate for any losses in their ordinary consumption expenses, those with a meager intake had no means to offset inflation.
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Conclusion
It is difficult to conceive of "social reforms" in China over 30 years-even looking just at the cities-as a process whose outcomes for the populace can be recapitulated in a one-size-fits-all fashion. 
